This paper analyses the role of pork-barrel politics in the allocation of public investment expenditures in Greece. It proposes a model which explicitly relates the allocation of public investment to electoral results using a unique dataset covering the period from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until 2009, just before the Great Recession that radically transformed the political panorama of the country. The analysis includes ten legislative periods marked by governments of the two parties that dominated the political arena in Greece: the Liberal and the Socialist Party. The results show that Socialist and re-elected governments applied more expansionary fiscal policies relative to Liberals. The two main parties also used different tactics when it came to pork-barrelling: while the Socialists when in government rewarded/groomed their electoral fiefs, the Liberals invested in areas controlled by the opposition to win over new votes or seats.
Introduction
The analysis of the territorial allocation of public expenditure is an area of research with a long tradition. At the crossroads between public economics, political science, and political geography, the literature on the implications of pork-barrel politics has increasingly become more theoretically and empirically sophisticated (Golden and Min 2013) . Different empirical studies offer a variety of outcomes and interpretations, depending on the discipline of origin, the approach adopted, or the individual countries or groups of countries covered.
One of the drivers of this type of research is the realisation that government decisions about the geographical allocation of public spending are not always driven only by 'objective' socio-economic criteria, such as efficiency and/or equity, as the normative theory of public finance would claim (Buchanan 1950) , but also by political considerations (Oates 1972; Bennett 1980) . And in few countries has the link between pork-barrel politics and economic outcomes been more under the spotlight than in Greece, making it a particularly interestingand, until now, neglected -case study to analyse for a number of reasons.
First, pork-barrelling in public investment is always prominent in countries with strong clientelistic and/or nepotistic networks. In Greece the provision of collective goods, such as bridges and highways or schools and hospitals, has often been regarded as a perk to pay back voters for their electoral support. Second, Greece being a highly centralised country, the decisions about how to allocate public projects -regardless of whether the actual expenditure takes place at the national or at the local level -can often be traced back to national elections.
Third, the high level of Greek fiscal centralisation and the lack of a specific formula for the regional allocation of public investment leaves plenty of room for political bargaining -and, hence, for pork-barrelling -about the territorial allocation of public expenditure. Fourth, regional development was one of the avowed policy priorities of successive Greek national governments throughout the period of analysis. Infrastructure investment was used as the main mechanism for upgrading the competitiveness and cohesion of regional economies and was the target of a high proportion of the projects co-funded through EU structural assistance.
Fifth, Greece organized the 2004 Olympic Games. The preparation of the Games meant that considerable financial resources were channelled towards infrastructure investment of dubious sustainability. In addition, the need to meet strict deadlines in the preparation for the Games and the implementation of parallel programmes to the Olympic Games, such as the so-called Greece 2004 -financing athletic and other types of infrastructures in every single municipality across the country -is considered to have allowed plenty of opportunities for pork-barrel politics.
The specific institutional conditions of Greece and the combination of factors outlined above hint that pork-barrel politics may have contributed to distorting regional development policy priorities and undermining the programmatic targeting towards the less well-off regions of the country. In addition, it might have contributed to a macroeconomic situation characterised by high public spending, growing deficits, and galloping debt. The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 discusses scholarly approaches to pork-barrelling and highlights the key features of the Greek political setting.
Section 3 presents the data, the variables, and the econometric model. Section 4 discusses the regression results, while section 5 concludes.
Pork-barrel politics and public investment 2.1 Politics and public investment
Theories of distributive politics frequently pay particular attention to the processes behind pork-barrel politics. Electoral considerations often play a key role in the allocation of public expenditure by incumbent governments. Rather than expenditure following 'objective' socioeconomic criteria, in contexts where pork-barrelling is pervasive, electoral considerations and the expectations for and results of electoral contests may become fundamental drivers behind the territorial allocation of public expenditure. Incumbent governments, considered as profit maximisers, may allocate public resources with the aim of extracting the highest electoral benefit, rather than pursuing equity and/or efficiency.
Scholarly research provides ample evidence of the presence of pork-barrel politics. There are numerous examples in Europe. Limosani and Navarra (2001) find that in pre-election yeas local policy-makers in Italy have had a tendency to increase investment outlays beyond their standard growth rate. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) demonstrate that in Sweden incumbent governments have used grant programmes to win votes. Celbis, de Crombrugghe and Muysken (2014) suggest that political bias has been present in the allocation decisions of regional transportation and communication public investments in Turkey.
Pork-barrelling is also widespread as a political practice in the Americas. In the United States Primo and Snyder (2010) , for example, show that those areas of the US where a party clearly dominates, attract less attention in terms of distributive spending, because of a decreased incentive for individual legislators to secure a 'personal vote' via local projects. More examples of pork-barrelling have been described by Chen (2010) in the case of New York, who proves that the electoral geography of legislative districts affects pork-barrelling under bicameralism. He indicates that greater electoral fragmentation has a negative effect on porkbarrelling. Stokes (2005) Not all research, however, indicates that pork-barrelling is pervasive. De La Calle and Orriols (2010) for example, using as a case study the expansion of the underground network in Madrid, show that, although governments are often tempted to follow vote-seeking strategies, they cannot deviate too much from an efficiency-based allocation of public resources. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) establish that, although politics in Turkey plays a non-negligible role in influencing public investment allocations, the magnitude of pork-barrelling is relatively low in comparison to the role played by socioeconomic factors when determining how to allocate public investment across Turkish regions.
In pork-barrel environments, the specific allocation of public funding frequently depends on the electoral prospects of the ruling party in specific constituencies. Political constituencies can be divided accordingly into three types (Johnston 1977 ): a) 'hopeless' areas, where the ruling party has a very low level of electoral support and little hope of ever winning more support; b) 'safe' areas, where the ruling party has a high level of popular support and its victory in various electoral contests is virtually guaranteed; and c) 'marginal' areas, where the ruling party either has a slight majority or its opponents have a slight lead over it. In such a categorization, governments will prioritise, depending on their main objectives, either rewarding existing electoral support or gaining new support.
Two contesting models have been put forward in the scientific literature: the 'loyal voter' and the 'swing voter' model. The 'loyal voter' model assumes that governments allocate public funds to reward constituencies where their core supporters live (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Golden and Picci 2008) . The 'swing voter' model assumes, by contrast, that governments prefer to splash public investment in those regions where the biggest electoral gains can be achieved (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013; Golden and Picci 2008) . Whereas in the former model incumbent governments reward the past electoral support of their voters, in the latter they aim to buy-off votes by prioritizing expenditures to swing regions. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006: 549) , in an attempt to bridge this dichotomy, argue that it may also be possible that parties chose to target both loyal and swing areas simultaneously.
Greece, public investment, and pork-barrel politics
There is a widespread popular perception that politics plays an important role in the regional distribution of public spending, in general, and public investment, in particular, in Greece. It is not infrequent to read in the local press news about politicians boasting about their capacity to influence and 'deliver' investments in, say, roads or schools for their constituencies.
Political arguments make the public investment budget -an important section of the national budget -one of the most politicised instruments of government policy in the country (Psycharis 1990 ). While more 'objective' socio-economic criteria determine the bulk of public expenditure, this part of the national budget -which was introduced in 1952, has been the mechanism channelling EU structural funds to Greece since 1982, and is today under the authority of the Ministry of Development -remains however extremely vulnerable to political wrangling and pork-barrelling. Ministers, mayors, members of Parliament, and other politicians vie to carve a share of the public investment budget for their constituencies (Psycharis 2008 ).
However, the popular view of a polity riddled by pork-barrelling has not really been confirmed by the scholarly literature. The number of studies on distributive politics in Greece remains limited. The few that exist generally validate the presence of pork-barrel politics in the regional allocation of public funds, but the results are extremely sensitive to the different approaches adopted. Lambrinidis, Psycharis and Rovolis (2005) , for example, show that the percentage of votes in a prefecture in favour of the governing party has not been a fundamental driving force in the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure across prefectures. Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios (2012) , by contrast, demonstrate that differences in votes between the governing and the main opposition party in each prefecture determine the territorial allocation of public investment, which, in turn, influences growth rates across Greek prefectures. Psycharis (2008) finds evidence that politicians in key positions in government have funnelled public spending to their constituencies and/or regions of origin. As a result, the ways through which distributive politics influence the allocation of public investment are still open to investigation. This paper aims to supersede previous studies by proposing a model using the total volume of public investment -rather than public investment per capita (as in Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2015) -by political period as dependent variable, in order to examine how politics affects the regional allocation of public investments. The analysis controls for a series of variables that, under normal circumstances, would have affected the territorial distribution of public investment. We specifically focus on how public investment is allocated in order to provide different types of public goods and collective services to people in different areas of the country.
Data, Variables and Empirical specification: the Greek context
The main aim of the paper is to assess the impact of political factors on the distribution of total public investment expenditures across 51 Greek regions (NUTS III level) over 10 political periods, paying particular attention to the behaviour of different political parties with regards to pork-barrelling when in office. The choice of spatial level and political periods of analysis is not casual. 1 Table 1 displays a) the dates of the national Greek elections, b)
which party was in office, and c) the changes in governing party. ND was the governing party in the periods 1975 -1977 , 1978 -1981 , 1990 -1993 , 2004 -2007 -2009 was in office during the periods 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1994-1996, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003 . During the period of analysis each party was in office for a total of 5 political periods. Insert Table 1 
Insert Figure 1 around here
In particular, we formulate and empirically test three hypotheses regarding potential political influences in the allocation of public investment across Greek regions. First, we analyse the extent to which differences between parties in political power in a given region determine public investment expenditures in the region. Second, we assess whether the re-election of a party leads to greater pork-barrelling than a first-time election. Third, we examine whether public investment expenditures differ depending on the orientation of the party in office (i.e.
between the Liberal and the Socialist Party). We use the following simple model:
where Invit is the natural logarithm of the total volume of public investment expenditures in
GovPartyt is a dummy variable coding whether the governing party at period t was ND (t = 1, 2, 5, 9, and 10) or PASOK (t = 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 ) (base category), ChGovPartyt is a dummy variable indicating whether the governing party at period t had been re-elected (t = 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10) or changed (t = 1, 3, 5, 6 , and 9) (base category), PolitPowerit is a vector of regional political power variables (i.e. pork-barrel politics variables) in region i and at period t, and Controlit is a vector of control variables in region i and at period t.
We expect differences in regional political power -following the 'loyal' vs. 'swing' voter model -to affect the allocation of public investment (Hypothesis 1). We do not anticipate differences in pork-barrelling behaviour between the Liberals and the Socialists (Hypothesis 2), as corruption is widespread in Greek society (European Commission 2014). Finally, we consider that re-elected governments, that are already familiar with the levers of power, will resort to pork-barrelling in greater measure than first-time elected governments (Hypothesis
and
Equation (1) tests Hypothesis 1, Equation (2) tests Hypothesis 2, and Equation (3) Hypothesis 3.
The regional political power variables are depicted by the percentage votes and seats (MPs)
for each party in each region. More specifically, the regional political power variables include the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, and of minority parties, measured as:
• the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of ND (%ND -Votes (Seats));
• the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of PASOK (%PASOK -Votes (Seats)), and;
• the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of minority parties (e.g. the Greek
Communist(s) Parties) (%Rest -Votes (Seats)).
The regional political power variables also include the ('absolute') regional political power of the governing party and the regional political power of the governing party relative to the main opposition party. This latter variable is known as the 'relative' political power of the governing party (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2012). The variables, respectively, are measured as:
• the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of the governing party (%GovParty -Votes (Seats)); 3 and
• the difference in the percentage votes (seats) in the region in favour of the governing party (Dif%GovParty -Votes (Seats)). (Seats)). The political power of the minority parties (%Rest -Votes (Seats)) was higher when the governing party was the Liberal Party or the governing party had been re-elected. This is possibly because the minority parties comprise chiefly the two Communist Parties (the more traditional KKE and the Eurocommunist KKE-Interior and their successive transformations), which are closer to the Socialists than to the Liberals. Both the absolute and the relative political power of the governing party (%GovParty -Votes (Seats) and Dif%GovParty -Votes (Seats)) were higher when the governing party was the Liberal Party or the governing party had been re-elected.
Moreover, the absolute and the relative regional political power of the governing party was higher based on the percentage of seats than on the percentage of votes. Finally, the political power of single-seat constituencies was higher when the governing party had been re-elected.
Insert Table 2 around here
The control variables (Control) include region-specific characteristics that either change over time or are time-invariant. The reason for the choice of control variables was related to their presence in the literature and previous empirical studies about pork-barrelling and corruption, as well as to data availability issues. The time-variant region-specific characteristics are GDP per capita (divided by 10,000), as a measure of regional economic development; Density which uses regional population density (population/km 2 ) in order to capture regional agglomeration; and Earthquakes, which is a dummy variable coding earthquakes with victims or casualties. 5 Size (in km 2 divided by 10,000) is an indicator of the size (area) of the region and is a time-invariant, region-specific characteristic. 6 The empirical specification also includes political period dummies to control for all political-period-specific region-invariant variables (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2012). All these controls capture some regional features and are likely to deal with some sources of heterogeneity reducing the omitted variable bias.
The correlations between the GovParty, ChGovParty, and Control variables are low, but the correlations between the regional political power variables (PolitPower) are high. 1. Based on data on the percentage of votes, possible differences between low, medium, and high regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, the minority parties, and the governing party respectively are examined. 8 The high political power regions capture 'safe' regions; the medium political power regions capture 'marginal' (or 'swing') regions;
while the so-called low political power regions capture 'hopeless' regions for the political parties. More specifically:
5 The reason for controlling for earthquakes is that Greece is a seismic country. Past earthquakes have resulted in understandably significant changes in the allocation of public investment expenditures. Examples of such changes were the concentration of public funds in affected areas in such as Thessaloniki (1978) , Korinthia (1981 ), Messini (1986 ), Achaia (1995 , and Attiki (1999), after earthquakes. 6 GDP and population are not included as control variables, since they are highly correlated with each other (0.9725) as well as with population density (0.9562 and 0.9818, respectively). 7 The correlation coefficients can be provided by the authors upon request. 8 The scheme used for the allocation of the regions to the different classifications (low, medium and high) is a combination of an 'exogenous' scheme, defined by criteria external to the distribution of data (e.g. regions with high political power are dominated by the two main political parties in Greece); an 'arbitrary' scheme, in which class boundaries are set by arbitrary criteria such as equal intervals; and an 'ideographic' scheme, where class boundaries are defined by the shape of the distribution (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2011). Nevertheless, the regression results are robust to alternative classifications (e.g.
≤ %ND (%PASOK) -Votes ≤ 40).
The robustness of the regression results using alternative class boundaries and the distribution of the political variables can be provided by the authors upon request.
• if %ND -Votes < 30, %PASOK -Votes < 30, %Rest -Votes < 10 and %GovParty -Votes < 30, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, or minority parties, and of the governing party, respectively, is low; Possible differences between a low, medium, and high relative regional political power of the governing party are also taken into account. Thus,
• if Dif%GovParty -Votes < -5, the relative regional political power of the governing party is low and represents the opposition groups (i.e. 'hopeless' regions for the governing party);
• if -5 ≤ Dif%GovParty -Votes ≤ 5, the relative regional political power of the governing party is medium (base category) and represents the marginal constituencies [i.e. 'marginal' (or 'swing') regions]; and,
• if Dif%GovParty -Votes > 5, the relative regional political power of the governing party is high and represents the ruling party's core constituencies (i.e. 'safe' regions for the governing party).
2. Based on data on the percentage of seats, possible differences between monopolistic, high, medium, low, and no political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party and the governing party are considered. Hence,
• if %ND -Seats = 100, %PASOK -Seats = 100, %GovParty -Seats = 100 and
Dif%GovParty -Seats = 100, the regional political power of the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, and the governing party (absolute or relative) respectively is monopolistic;
• if 50 < %ND -Seats < 100, 50 < %PASOK -Seats < 100, 50 < %GovParty -Seats < 100 and 0 < Dif%GovParty -Seats < 100, the regional political power of the Liberal Party is higher than that of the Socialist Party, the regional political power of the Socialist Party is higher than that of the Liberal Party, and the regional political power of the governing party (absolute or relative) is higher than that of the opposition party, respectively;
• if %ND -Seats = 50, %PASOK -Seats = 50, %GovParty -Seats = 50 and Dif%GovParty -Seats = 0, the regional political power of the Liberal Party matches that of the Socialist Party (i.e. 50 per cent) (base category);
• if 0 < %ND -Seats < 50, 0 < %PASOK -Seats < 50, 0 < %GovParty -Seats < 50
and -100 < Dif%GovParty -Seats < 0, the regional political power of the Liberal Party is lower than that of the Socialist Party, the regional political power of the Socialist Party is lower than that of the Liberal Party, and the regional political power of the governing party (absolute or relative) is lower than that of the opposition party, respectively; and
• if %ND -Seats = 0, %PASOK -Seats = 0, %GovParty -Seats = 0 and
Dif%GovParty -Seats = -100, there is no political power for the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, and the governing party (absolute or relative), respectively.
As for the minority parties, the paper analyses possible differences in political influence between a low percentage seats in the region in favour of the minority parties (%Rest -Seats < 5) (base category) and a high percentage of seats (5 ≤ %Rest -Seats ≤ 100).
Regression results
This section presents the regression results of the political determinants of the regional Table 4 the absolute regional political power of the governing party (%GovParty -Votes) and the relative regional political power of the governing party (Dif%GovParty -Votes).
All estimations have a good fit, as they explain more than two thirds of the variation in regional public investment expenditures. 9 Because of space constraints, we do not report the coefficients on the Control variables (i.e. GDP per capita, Size, Density, and Earthquakes).
10
The results on the controls show that public investment was higher in large, high-density regions and, as expected, in regions which had been affected by earthquakes causing victims or casualties. There is, however, no evidence of an association between regional economic development and regional public investment expenditures.
The results also indicate that the total volume of public investment expenditures was higher when the Socialists were in office -during the periods 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1994-1996, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003 -than when Greece was governed by the Liberals (see the coefficients on the GovParty variable). They also demonstrate that, after being re-elected (during the periods 1986-1989, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003) , the tendency of the Socialist Party to make use of public investment for political purposes was significantly greater than when elected for the first time (see the coefficients on the ChGovParty variable). Table 3 and public investment (Regressions 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) . Investment was particularly targeted at regions with a high percentage of Socialist vote (%PASOK > 50) (Regressions 12, 16, 18, and 20) . As can be expected, the association was stronger when the Socialist Party was in office (Regression 14 vs 16) and, especially, after being re-elected (Regression 18 vs 20). Hence, the Socialist Party adopted a different stance with respect to pork-barrelling than the Liberals. Rather than courting opposition voters in swing constituencies, they groomed their electoral bases in safe districts.
The regional political power of the Liberal and the Socialist Party

Insert Table 3 around here
As they were never in office during the period of analysis, it comes as no surprise that there is no evidence that the regional political power of minority parties (%Rest -Votes) was translated into any changes in public investment (see Appendix 1). The regional political power of the Socialist Party was reflected in a more favourable treatment of its safe-seat constituencies in terms of public investment. There is less evidence of such behaviour in the case of the Liberal Party (see Appendix 2). Table 4 shows that there is no evidence of a linear statistically significant association between the absolute regional political power of the governing party and regional expenditures (Regression 1). This is possibly the result of a negative linear relationship when the Liberal Party is considered (Regressions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Table 3 ) and a positive one in the case of the Socialist Party (Regressions 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 of Table 3 ). However, both parties seem to have behaved in a similar way after re-elections (ND in 1978 -1981 , PASOK in 1986 -1989 , PASOK in 1997 -1999 and 2000 -2003 , and ND in 2008 -2009 ). Re-elections of an incumbent party are connected to a greater tendency to resort to pork-barrelling, mostly favouring regions that have strongly supported the party in government (%GovParty > 50) (Regressions 9 and 10). Therefore, we find that the re-elected governing parties repeatedly resorted to skewing the distribution of investments in favour of their core constituencies (i.e.
The absolute and relative regional political power of the governing party
'safe' regions). Regions that traditionally gave a higher percentage of the vote to the reelected governing party generally received larger shares of public investment than their neighbours that voted for the opposition party.
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Conclusions
This paper has delved into the largely overlooked question of the presence and relevance of pork-barrel politics in the four decades after the restoration of democracy in Greece However, while pork-barrelling was practiced by the two parties that alternated in power in the period between the restoration of democracy and the outbreak of the Great Recession, the analysis has revealed that each party followed a different strategy. The Liberal Party mainly allocated public investment with the aim of gaining additional support and new seats in Parliament by courting the electorate in 'swing' constituencies. The Socialist, by contrast, preferred rewarding electoral trust, overspending in 'safe' electoral districts. Re-election exacerbated these practices. Re-elected governments splashed more on pork-barrelling once the confidence of the electorate was renewed and decision-makers felt more at ease with governing Greece. The Socialist party, according to the results of the analysis, made greater public investment spending than the Liberals, as the public investment link to votes and MPs was highest during the periods between 1986-1989, 1997-1999, and 2000-2003, coinciding with the re-election of PASOK. These results are robust to measuring political power by votes as well as by MPs.
Political influences in the allocation of public investment can be considered as an important source of distortion for regional development policy priorities and a serious institutional flaw in the functioning of the Greek democracy. They may have also been a reason behind the excessive spending which led to the generation of substantial annual deficits and debts. In this respect, this article sets a marker about the role played by political parties in undermining the efficiency of the regional development effort for real or perceived party-political gains.
However, this article has mostly only scratched the surface, establishing connections, but not exploring the mechanisms through which this pork-barrel was generated, allowed, managed, and tolerated. More research is needed, first, in order to assess whether Greece represents a particular case in terms of pork-barrel politics or whether this type of behaviour is -as implied by some of the literature highlighted in the literature review -more widespread, especially across other southern European countries. In addition, more qualitative and indepth research will have to be conducted in order to assess the exact ways in which decisionmakers influenced and shaped the allocation of public investment for the benefit of their parties, often at the expense of sound and efficient policies and of the Greek people as a whole. -Nov-1974 1975 -1977 ND Change 2 20-Nov-1977 1978 -1981 ND No Change 3 18-Oct-1981 1982 -1985 PASOK Change 4 02-Jun-1985 1986 -1989 PASOK No Change 5 08-Apr-1990 1990 -1993 ND Change 6 10-Oct-1993 1994 -1996 PASOK Change 7 22-Sept-1996 1997 -1999 On-line Appendix 2: The absolute and relative regional political power of the governing party (%GovParty -Seats and Dif%GovParty -Seats, respectively) On-line Appendix 4: The regional political power of the minority parties (%Rest -Seats) 
